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  4-FOLD DUTIES OF A LAWYER 1. DUTIES TO SOCIETY -  Should not violate his responsibility to society, exemplar for rightousness, ready to re...

 4-FOLD DUTIES OF A LAWYER


1. DUTIES TO SOCIETY - Should not violate his responsibility to society, exemplar for rightousness, ready to render legal aid, foster social reforms guardian of due process, aware of special role in the solution of special problems

2. DUTIES TO THE LEGAL PROFESSION - Candor, fairness, courtesy, and truthfulness, avoid encroachment in the business of other lawyers, uphold the honor of the profession.

3. DUTIES OF THE COURT - Respect or defend against criticisms, uphold authority and dignity, obey order and processes, assist in the administration of justice

4. DUTIES TO THE CLIENT - Entire devotion to client's interest

  LAWYER'S OATH I, _________, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its c...

 LAWYER'S OATH


I, _________, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, or give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well as to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself these voluntary obligations without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God

 G.R. NO. L-2956                                                                                                                            ...

 G.R. NO. L-2956                                                                                                            MAY 23, 1951

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

VS

ELEUTERIO ICARO

FACTS:


        During the latter part of 1944, and early 1945, while the United States of America, the Philippines, and the Allied Nations were at war with the Japanese Empire, Defendant Eleuterio Icaro, a Filipino Citizen, owing faith and allegiance to both America and the Commonwealth of the Philippines, openly adhered to the enemy, and gave it aid and comfort. Armed with a rifle, and in company with other Filipinos and Japanese soldiers, also armed, and in company with other Filipinos and Japanese soldiers, also armed, he took part in raids against guerilla suspects, and in their arrest.

    The Court of First Instance of Laguna, found him guilty of treason. He denies that he was a Makapili.

ISSUE:

        Can the Appellant be held guilty of treason

RULING:

        Yes. The point becomes unnecessary, since adherence to the enemy may be inferred from the overt acts of treason committed by the appellant, consisting in the arrest of persons suspected of being guerrillas who, with the exception of one Emilio Biscocho, were never seen again, especially because the appellant was armed and in company with armed Japanese soldiers and other Filipinos.

      

  G.R. NO. 100113                                                                                                              SEPTEMBER 3, ...

 G.R. NO. 100113                                                                                        SEPTEMBER 3, 1991

RENATO CAYETANO

VS. 

CHRISTIAN MONSOD, ET AL

FACTS:

        Monsod was nominated to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC on April 25, 1991, by then President Corazon Aquino. Petitioner Cayetano questioned the nomination because allegedly Monsod have not been engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years. 

        Respondent Monsod has worked as a lawyer in the law office of his father from 1960 - 1963; As an operations officer with the World Bank Group from 1963 - 1970; CEO of an investment bank from 1970 - 1986; Consultant in various companies in 1986; Secretary General in 1986; member of the Constitutional Commission from 1986-1987; National Chairman of NAMFREL in 1987; and member of the quasi-judicial Davide Commission in 1990.

        On June 5, 1991, The Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. Hence, the petitioner challenged the validity of the confirmation by the CA.

ISSUE:

    Whether or Not the respondent possesses the required qualification.

RULING:

    Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that Atty. Monsod indeed possessed the required qualification. In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava: The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matter connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services, contemplating an appearance before the judicial body, the foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of    estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice.

       Practice of law means any activity, in or out court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. In general, a practice of law requires a lawyer and client relationship, it is whether in or out of court. As such, the petition is dismissed."

    

 Practice of law means any activity, in or out court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience.

  G.R. NO. 182748                                                                                                                      DECEM...

 G.R. NO. 182748                                                                                              DECEMBER 13, 2011

ARNEL COLINARES

VS.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:

        Arnel Colinares was charged with Frustrated Homicide for hitting the head of the Private Complainant with a piece of stone. He alleged self-defense but the trial court found him guilty of the crime charged and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment from 2 years and 4 months of prision correccional, as minimum, to 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum.  Since the maximum probationable imprisonment under the law was only up to 6 years, Arnel did not qualify for probation.

Arnel appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), invoking self-defense and, alternatively, seeking conviction for the lesser crime of attempted homicide with the consequent reduction of the penalty imposed on him.  His conviction was affirmed by the CA. 

ISSUE:

    Whether or Not Arnel Colinares may still apply for probation on remand of the case to the trial

RULING:

    Yes, The Supreme Court ruled that Colinares may apply for probation upon remand of his case to the RTC. Ordinarily, an accused would no longer be entitled to apply for probation, he having appealed from the judgment of the RTC convicting him for frustrated homicide. But in this case the Supreme Court ruled to set aside the judgment of the RTC and found him only liable for attempted homicide, if the Supreme Court follows the established rule that no accused can apply for probation on appeal, the accused would suffer from the erroneous judgment of the RTC with no fault of his own, therefore defying fairness and equity.



  C.A., 38 O.G. 2870                                                                                                                 July 13...

 

C.A., 38 O.G. 2870                                                                                                               July 13, 1938

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

VS.

ANASTACIO APOLINAR

HONTIVEROS, J.:

FACTS:

                Midnight of December 22, 1936, Anastacio Apolinar was at that time the occupant of a parcel of land owned by Joaquin Gonzales in Pangasinan. Armed with a shutgon, Apolinar was looking over said land when he observed that there was a man carrying a bundle on his shoulder. Believing that he was a thief, Apolinar called his attention but he ignored him. Thereafter, the defendant fired in the air then at the person, who however managed to flee. The person was identified to be Domingo Petras, was able to get back to his house and consequently narrated to Angel Natividad, the barrio chief, that he had been wounded in the back by a shotgun. He then showed two wounds – one in each side of the spinal column – which wounds were circular in form and a little bigger than a quarter of an inch, according to the medical report Dr. Mananquil. Petras died from the gunshot wounds he sustained. Apolinar surrendered the shotgun to the authorities immediately after the incident and gave a sworn statement.

ISSUE:

                Whether or not the killing of Petras was justified by defense of property

RULING:

                NO, defense of property does not justify the killing of Petras. Evidence shows that upon getting seriously wounded, he was carrying a sack of palay on his arms coming from the land tilled by the defendant. However, this is not sufficient for the defendant to be justified in shooting the deceased. The right to property is not of such importance as right to life, and defense of property is invoked as a justifying circumstance only when it is coupled with an attack on the person of one entrusted with the property.



  THE UNITED STATES  VS. AH CHONG G.R. NO. L-5272; MARCH 19, 1910 FACTS:      Ah Chong was employed as a cook at Fort McKinley, and at the s...

 THE UNITED STATES  VS. AH CHONG

G.R. NO. L-5272; MARCH 19, 1910

FACTS:

    Ah Chong was employed as a cook at Fort McKinley, and at the same place Pascual Gualberto was employed as a house boy or muchacho. They shared a small room in Officers’ Quarters 27.

                On the night of August 14, 1908, Ah Chong was awakened by someone who was trying to force open the room. He sat up in bed and called out twice, “who is there?” He heard no answer and feared that the one pushing the door and forcing his way into the room was a thief, he leaped to his feet and called out, “if you enter the room, I will kill you.” At the moment he was struck just above the knee by the edge of the chair which had been placed against the door. In the darkness and Confusion the defendant thought that the blow had been inflicted by the burglar. Ah Chong seized a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, he struck out wildly at the intruder who, it afterwards turned out, was his roommate, Pascual. Seeing that Pascual was wounded, he called to his employers and ran back to his room to secure bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds.

                Ah chong stated that he kept a knife under his pillow to protect him because of the repeated robberies. Ah chong admitted that he killed pascual under the impression that he thought pascual was a robber because he forced open the door, despite warnings.

ISSUE:

       Whether or Not Ah Chong can be held criminally liable 

RULING:

    NO, Ah Chong must be acquitted because of the mistake of fact. A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at bar convinces us that the defendant Chinaman struck the fatal blow alleged in the information in the firm belief that the intruder who forced open the door of his room was a thief, from whose assault he was in imminent peril. That in view of all the circumstances, he acted in good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing no more than exercising his legitimate right of self-defense; that had the facts been as he believed them to be he would have been wholly exempt from criminal liability on account of his act; and that he cannot be said to have been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the facts, or in the means adopted by him to defend himself from the imminent danger which he believe threatened his person and the property under his charge.

The defendant should acquitted of the crime with which he is charged and his bail bond exonerated, with the costs of both instance de oficio. So ordered.




PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SUNICO;  C.A., 50 O.G. 5880 FACTS:                The accused were employees of COMELEC whose duty among other...

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SUNICO; C.A., 50 O.G. 5880

FACTS:

            The accused were employees of COMELEC whose duty among others was to transfer the names of excess voters in other precincts to the list of the newly created precincts. There were several voters that were omitted in the list, therefore, were not allowed to vote. The accused was prosecuted for violations of Section. 101 and Section 103 of the Revised Penal Code. The accused claimed that they made the omission in good faith. The trial court seemed to believe that notwithstanding the fact that the accused committed in good faith the serious offense charged, the latter criminally responsible therefore, because such offense is malum prohibitum, and, consequently, the act constituting the same need not be committed with malice or criminal intent to be punishable.

ISSUE:

    Whether or Not the act of the accused is merely a mala prohibita?

RULING:

        The acts of the accused cannot be mala prohibita – they are mala in se. The omission or failure to include a voter’s name in the registry list of voters is not only wrong because it is prohibited; it is wrong per se because it disenfranchises a voter and violates one of his fundamental rights. Hence,for such act to be punishable, it must be shown that it has been committed with malice. There is no clear showing in the instant case that the accused intentionally, willfully and maliciously omitted or failed to include in the registry list of voters the names of those voters. They cannot be punished criminally.

+ the Revised Election Code, as far as its penal provisions are concerned, is a special law, it being not a part of the RPC or its amendments.



  PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES  VS.  IRENEO TUMLOS;  G.R. No. 46428; April 13, 1939 EN BANC FACTS:                On or about November 21, 1937...


 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. IRENEO TUMLOS; G.R. No. 46428; April 13, 1939

EN BANC

FACTS:

            On or about November 21, 1937, eight cows belonging to Maximiano Sobrevega and five belonging to his son-in-law, Ambrosio Pecasis, then grazing together in the barrio of Libong-cogon, municipality of Sara, Province of Iloilo, were taken by the herein defendant without the knowledge or consent of their respective owners. The deputy fiscal of Iloilo filed on July 11, 1938, an information against the said defendant for the offense of theft of the eight cows belonging to Maximiano Sobrevega, which resulted in his being sentenced on July 15, 1938, to an indeterminate penalty of from one year, eight months and twenty-one days to five years, five months and eleven days of prision correccional, with the accessories prescribed by law and costs. In the information filed in the present case the same defendant is charged with the theft of five cows belonging to Ambrosio Pecasis, committed on November 21, 1937, the date of the commission of the theft to the eight cows of Maximiano Sobrevega charged to the previous information.

ISSUE:

    Whether or Not the petitioner committed a continuous crime (Delito Continuado)

RULING:

                YES, Irineo Tumlos committed a continuous crime. The theft of the thirteen cows committed by the defendant took place at the same time and in the same place; consequently, he performed but one act. The fact that eight of said cows pertained to one owner and five to another does not make him criminally liable for two distinct offenses, for the reason that in such case the act must be divided into two, which act is not susceptible of division.

                 The intention was likewise one, namely, to take for the purpose of appropriating or selling the thirteen cows which he found grazing in the same place. As neither the intention nor the criminal act is susceptible of division, the offense arising from the concurrence of its two constituent elements cannot be divided, it being immaterial that the subject matter of the offense is singular or plural, because whether said subject matter be one or several animate or inanimate objects, it is but one.